To address possible capability gaps in its systems, the U.S. Army should examine options for countering long-range rockets, support research and development in robotics, consider approaches to lighten the loads for infantrymen, and examine the need for a new specialized manned reconnaissance aircraft.

In 2017, the Army’s premier institution for the study of warfighting, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, identified seventeen conventional warfighting capability gaps that emerged in the force after years of sustained counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) warfighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. 1 These gaps emerged over time as the Army reorganized itself for COIN and CT.

This chapter identifies U.S. Army capability gaps1 based on known requirements identified through a review of national and DoD strate- gic and operational guidance documents and Army studies on capa- bility gaps. The intent is to identify a set of capability gaps that might be met by developing relevant capabilities in partner armies.

Significant gaps exist in the ability of the United States and its allies to deter or defeat aggression that could threaten national interests. For example, NATO members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain vulnerable to Russian invasion. South Korea is vulnerable to North Korea's artillery.

That means identifying potential capability gaps; writing the doctrine; training and educating future leaders; identifying needed materiel and facilities; and designing the organizations that will compete, fight and win against near-peer threats in large-scale combat operations (LSCO).